An analysis of algorithms for solving discrete logarithms in fixed groups by Mihalcik, Joseph P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2010-03
An analysis of algorithms for solving discrete
logarithms in fixed groups
Mihalcik, Joseph P.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
AN ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS FOR SOLVING 








 Thesis Advisor: Dennis Volpano 
 Second Reader: Harold Fredricksen 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2010 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  An Analysis of Algorithms for Solving Discrete 
Logarithms in Fixed Groups 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Joseph Mihalcik 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Department of Defense 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Internet protocols such as Secure Shell and Internet Protocol Security rely on the assumption that finding discrete 
logarithms is hard. The protocols specify fixed groups for Diffie-Hellman key exchange that must be supported. 
Although the protocols allow flexibility in the choice of group, it is highly likely that the specific groups required by 
the standards will be used in most cases. There are security implications to using a fixed group, because solving any 
discrete logarithm within a group is comparatively easier after a group-specific precomputation has been completed. 
In this work, we more accurately model real-world cryptographic applications with fixed groups. We use an analysis 









15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
71 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Discrete Logarithms, Analysis of Algorithms, Advice Strings, Diffie-Hellman 
Key Exchange 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS FOR SOLVING DISCRETE LOGARITHMS 
IN FIXED GROUPS 
 
Joseph P. Mihalcik 
Civilian, Department of Defense 
B.S., University of Maryland, College Park, 2000 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Peter Denning  
Chairman, Department of Computer Science  
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
iv
ABSTRACT
Internet protocols such as Secure Shell and Internet Protocol Security rely on the as-
sumption that finding discrete logarithms is hard. The protocols specify fixed groups for Diffie-
Hellman key exchange that must be supported. Although the protocols allow flexibility in the
choice of group, it is highly likely that the specific groups required by the standards will be
used in most cases. There are security implications to using a fixed group, because solving any
discrete logarithm within a group is comparatively easier after a group-specific precomputation
has been completed. In this work, we more accurately model real-world cryptographic appli-
cations with fixed groups. We use an analysis of algorithms to place an upper bound on the
complexity of solving discrete logarithms given a group-specific precomputation.
v
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I. Introduction
Thirty years ago, the field of cryptography was revolutionized when Whitfield Diffie
and Martin Hellman published New Directions in Cryptography [3]. In this seminal paper, they
introduced the idea of public key cryptography, a concept that now provides the foundation for
secure communications and secure financial transactions over the Internet. In the same paper,
they also described a method for exchanging secret keys over an insecure network. Now known
as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, this method is used within common network security pro-
tocols including Secure Shell (SSH) [28] and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) [12].
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is an application of group theory. Computing the se-
cret key requires modular exponentiation: raising a number to an exponent within a group of
integers modulo a prime number. The inverse operation of modular exponentiation is called
finding the discrete logarithm. Exponentiation is computationally easy, while finding discrete
logarithms is believed to be hard. The key exchange depends on this asymmetry in computa-
tional complexity for its security. If an adversary can compute discrete logarithms, the adversary
can break Diffie-Hellman and recover the secret key. This situation has lead to a vast amount
of research toward finding efficient algorithms to solve discrete logarithms and also towards
understanding the computational complexity of the discrete logarithm problem.
Algorithms solving discrete logarithms generally can be divided into two phases: a
precomputation phase and a search phase. The precomputation phase is run first and the result
is stored in memory. The stored result is used in the search phase to speed up computation of
the discrete logarithm. Often, the precomputation algorithm requires only the group description.
This means that the first phase is independent of any particular instance of a discrete logarithm.
Additional discrete logarithms over the same group can be solved by running just the search
phase.
Our work focuses on the efficiency of solving multiple discrete logarithms over the same
group. The practical importance of this investigation can be seen when we examine how the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used in real applications, such as the SSH and IPsec security
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protocols. Within these protocols, a small number of standard groups are defined. For example,
the standard for SSH only defines two groups that must be supported. There are valid reasons
to use standard groups. In particular, when two users exchange keys, using a standard group
relieves one user from the computational burden of creating a secure group and the other user
from the need to trust that it has been done securely. Choosing a secure group requires avoiding
certain groups with characteristics that make them easier to solve. Leaving group choice to a
standards committee saves the user significant computation time, but the result will be many
key exchanges occurring over the same fixed groups. This provides an advantage to the attacker
in that the cost of precomputation for a group can now be amortized over many key exchanges.
As more exchanges occur under a group, the group precomputation increases in value to an
attacker. Therefore, our analysis must take into account an attacker that can dedicate large
parallel systems to the precomputation.
Typically, a security analysis of discrete logarithm cryptography would consider the
complexity of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). However, the DLP is an incomplete model
for cryptographic applications with fixed groups. In these applications, the group is constant,
but the DLP treats the group as a variable input to the problem. In the DLP, the problem is to
find a single discrete logarithm in a given group, however, a precomputation provides no bene-
fit when solving only one instance. Group-specific precomputation is most valuable when the
group is reused often, which is the case for standards that specify fixed groups. Current secu-
rity proofs based on the DLP do not account for group-specific precomputation and, therefore,
underestimate the difficulty of attacking applications that specify fixed groups.
In this work, we present a more conservative security model for fixed groups that shows
that such real-world applications provide less cryptographic strength than previously acknowl-
edged. In particular, we introduce the para-discrete logarithm problem (PDLP), a variant of the
DLP where the group is not an input, but rather dependent only on the input size. This allows us
to model the result of a group-specific precomputation as an advice string. In complexity theory,
an advice string is roughly a piece of data provided to a help solve a computational problem,
and the data can be dependent on the size of the input, but not on the input itself. In the standard
DLP, the precomputation is not an advice string, because it is based on an input: the group.
Once the precomputation has been completed for a standard group, the DLP is reduced to our
PDLP with an advice string.
We use an analysis of algorithms to place an upper bound on the complexity of the para-
discrete logarithm problem with an advice string. In particular, we provide an analysis of the
common algorithms for solving discrete logarithms, focusing on the relationship between the
2
asymptotic running times of the two phases and the asymptotic bit-length of the advice string.
Given a group of order N , we show that the generalized para-discrete logarithm problem can be
solved inO(N1/3) group operations with an advice string of sizeO(N1/3). The precomputation
of such an advice string requires O(N2/3) group operations.
The rest of the work is as follows. In the next chapter, we review both the technical
background and the prior research in the field of cryptography that is relevant to understanding
our work. In Chapter III, we survey the known algorithms for the discrete logarithm problem
and perform a traditional analysis of their complexity. In Chapter IV, we consider the complex-
ity of discrete logarithms over fixed groups and reanalyze the discrete logarithm algorithms in
that context.
3
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II. Background
In this chapter, we review both the technical background and the prior research in the
field of cryptography that is relevant to understanding our work. In particular, we begin by
describing discrete logarithms. Next, we examine their importance in cryptology. Lastly, we
look at the use of fixed groups in cryptographic protocols.
A. Discrete Logarithms Explained
In this section, we describe discrete logarithms. In particular, we first relate discrete
logarithms to standard logarithms in real numbers. Then, we provide mathematical definitions
for group exponentiation and discrete logarithms. Next, we provide a simple concrete example
of discrete logarithms. Lastly, we first define the standard computational problems regarding
discrete logarithms; that is, the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and the generalized discrete
logarithm problem (GDLP). Throughout, we assume the reader is familiar with the concept of
groups from abstract algebra.
Discrete logarithms are so named because they are analogous to standard logarithms
with real numbers. Just as the logarithm is the inverse operation of exponentiation, the discrete
logarithm is the inverse operation of group exponentiation. In the real numbers, log ga = x if
gx = a. The same is true for discrete logarithms, except g and a are elements of a multiplicative
cyclic group, G, with generator g. A cyclic group is a group where all the elements of the group
can be generated by raising one element, a generator, to successive powers.





Methods such as repeated-squaring [16, Algorithm 2.143] allow group exponentiation to be
done efficiently, with just lg x multiplications. In the group Z∗n , where the group operation is
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multiplication modulo an integer, n, group exponentiation is called modular exponentiation. In
this setting, the value of gx is a if and only if gx ≡ a mod n. We can compute gx by raising g
to the power x in the integers, then finding the remainder modulo n. (There are more practical
algorithms as well [8].)
Finding a discrete logarithm means inverting the exponentiation and finding the expo-
nent x given the value, a. That is, given g, n, and a, find a value of x, 0 ≤ x < n − 1,
such that gx ≡ a mod n. While efficient algorithms exist for group exponentiation, no effi-
cient algorithm is known for computing discrete logarithms. This asymmetry is what makes
exponentiation useful in public key cryptography.
1. Discrete Logarithm Example
To further clarify, we will use a concrete example in Z∗p . The group Z∗p is the multiplica-
tive group of integers modulo a prime, p. The elements of Z∗p are the integers 1, 2, . . . , p − 1.
In this example, a is an element of the group that can be represented as a = gx, where x
is an integer, 0 ≤ x < p − 1. The discrete logarithm of a to the base g, can be written as
log ga = log gg
x = x. For this example, if we let p = 11 and g = 2, Table 1 shows the pow-
ers of g. If we look in the table at the row x = 4 we see a = gx = 24 = 16 ≡ 5 mod 11.
All ten elements of Z∗p are generated before we see another 1 in the table. For every g ∈ Z∗p ,
gp−1 ≡ 1 mod p, and, if g is a generator, then there is no element 0 ≤ x < p − 1 such that
gx ≡ 1 mod p. There is no x < 10 such that 2x ≡ 1 mod 11, so 2 is a generator of Z∗11 . Also
note that the values for greater exponents repeat, 20 = 210 = 1 mod 11.
When we invert this table we have the discrete logarithms in Z∗11 . Table 2 shows us the
discrete logarithms. For example, looking in the table at a = 5 we find log 25 = 4.
2. Discrete Logarithm Problem
Before we can analyze the security of cryptography, it is helpful to formally define the
computational problems upon which that security relies. The DLP is the problem of solving
discrete logarithms over the group of integers modulo a prime and can be formalized as fol-
lows [16],
Definition 1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
Input: Prime: p, Generator of Z∗p: g, Element of Z∗p: a
Output: Exponent: x satisfying gx ≡ a mod p, where 0 ≤ x < p− 1.
6
















Table 1: Powers of g = 2 in Z∗11
Discrete logarithms can be defined over any cyclic group; they need not be restricted
to Z∗p . Therefore, the discrete logarithm problem can be generalized to apply to any cyclic
group [16].
Definition 2 The Generalized Discrete Logarithm Problem (GDLP)
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator of G: g, Element of G : a
Output: Exponent: x satisfying gx = a, where 0 ≤ x < |G|.
B. Cryptography and Discrete Logarithms
The difficulty of solving discrete logarithms relative to exponentiation makes them very
useful in cryptographic applications. The security of many common cryptographic applications
depends on the assumption that solving discrete logarithms is infeasible. The first published
cryptographic use of discrete logarithms was in the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [3].
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a log ga = x
1 log 21 0
2 log 22 1
3 log 23 8
4 log 24 2
5 log 25 4
6 log 26 9
7 log 27 7
8 log 28 3
9 log 29 6
10 log 210 5
Table 2: Discrete Logarithms to the Base g = 2 in Z∗11
The first public key cryptosystem relying on discrete logarithms was the ElGamal cryptosys-
tem [4]. ElGamal also developed the first signature scheme based on discrete logarithms, a
variant of which is the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [19].
In this section, we present several cryptographic algorithms to demonstrate the practical
importance of discrete logarithms. In particular, we first examine the Diffie-Hellman key agree-
ment scheme. Next, we focus on the public key encryption system known as ElGamal. Finally,
we examine the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).
1. Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement enables two parties to agree on a secret key over an
insecure channel without revealing the key to an attacker. In this scheme, two participants, A
and B, agree on a cyclic group, G, and generator of the group, g. We must assume the attacker
will know the details of the group, as they will be sent over the same insecure channel. A and B
independently and randomly choose their own secret exponents, a and b, respectively. User A
computes and transmits ga; B computes and transmits gb. The secret key they agree on is gab.
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User A computes the secret key by raising gb (received from B) to the power, a (A’s secret),
(gb)a = gba = gab
Equivalently, user B raises the value ga to the power, b,
(ga)b = gab
Now both users know the secret key, gab, while the attacker has only seen ga and gb.
Clearly, however, if the attacker could compute discrete logarithms in the group, G, then the
attacker could solve for either a or b and compute the secret key. It is an open question whether
there is an easier way to find gab than to compute discrete logarithms. This is called the Diffie-
Hellman problem.
It should also be noted that the Diffie-Hellman key agreement does not provide authen-
tication. An attacker with the ability to modify and insert messages could be in the middle of
an exchange between users A and B. If this occurs, A and B could unknowingly be sharing
keys with the attacker and not each other. To avoid this attack, Diffie-Hellman must be part of
a larger protocol that provides authentication.
2. ElGamal
The ElGamal cryptosystem is a method of public key encryption (PKE) that is based on
Diffie-Hellman [4]. In this subsection, we show that the security of ElGamal is dependent on
the difficulty of finding discrete logarithms. In particular, we begin with a formal definition of
PKE. Then we explain what it means for a PKE to be secure. Next we describe the ElGamal
algorithms. Finally, we demonstrate how the security of ElGamal would be compromised if an
efficient discrete logarithm method is discovered.
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Definition 3 Public Key Encryption (PKE)
A public key encryption system [6] is a triple of PPT algorithms (G,E,D) such that,
1. G is a key generation algorithm that on input 1k computes output (e, d).
2. E is an encryption algorithm that on input (1k, e,m) computes output c.
3. D is a decryption algorithm that on input (1k, d, c) computes output m.
where 1k is the security parameter, e is the public encryption key, d is the secret decryption key,
m ∈ {0, 1}k is the plaintext message and c ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the encrypted ciphertext such that if
G→ (e, d) then D(E(e,m), d) = m.
The security of a PKE system has been defined in terms of semantic security [6]. Infor-
mally, a PKE system is semantically secure if an adversary with access to the encryption key,
e, and ciphertext, c, has no more than a negligible advantage in guessing the plaintext over an
adversary without acesss to e or c.
Algorithm 4 ElGamal Key Generation
Input: Security parameter: 1k
Output: Public encryption key: e, Secret decryption key: d
p⇐ k-bit prime such that p− 1 has a large prime factor
g ⇐ generator of Z∗p
a⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
d⇐ (p, g, a)
e⇐ (p, g, ga)
return (e, d)
In ElGamal key generation, a user A selects a prime, p, that defines the multiplicative
group, Z∗p , a generator of that group, g, and a secret exponent a. User A also computes ga. (In
this, all arithmetic is mod p.) A’s private key, d is (p, g, a), and A’s public key, e, is (p, g, ga).
As ElGamal initially presented the scheme, the prime and generator be fixed for all users, and
the public key would be only (ga). He acknowledged that having each user select a prime “is
preferable from the security point of view although that will triple the size of the public file.” [4]
To encrypt a message for A, user B must represent his message as m, an element of Z∗p .
User B must choose a random exponent b and compute c1 = gb and c2 = (ga)bm = gabm. B
sends the encrypted message, (c1, c2), to A. To decrypt, A uses the private key, a, to compute
10
Algorithm 5 ElGamal Encryption
Input: Public encryption key: e = (p, g, ga), Plaintext message: m where 0 ≤ m ≤ p− 1
Output: Encrypted ciphertext: c
b⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
c1 ⇐ gb mod p
c2 ⇐ (ga)bm ≡ gabm mod p
c⇐ (c1, c2)
return c
Algorithm 6 ElGamal Decryption
Input: Private decryption key: d = (p, g, a), Encrypted ciphertext: c = (c1, c2) = (gb, gabm)
Output: Decrypted plaintext: m
gab ⇐ (c1)a ≡ (gb)a mod p
(gab)−1 ⇐ inverse of gab using extended Euclidean algorithm














As with Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal would be insecure if discrete logarithms could be
solved efficiently. An adversary with the ability to find discrete logarithms in Z∗p could recover
the private key, a, from the public key, ga. The adversary could then decrypt messages just as
the valid user can.
3. Digital Signature Algorithm
ElGamal also proposed a method for digital signatures in his 1984 paper, A public key
cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms [4]. A variation of that
method, the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), was adopted in 1994 as the Digital Signature
Standard (DSS) [19] and is in common use. In this subsection, we show that the security
of DSA is dependent on the difficulty of finding discrete logarithms. In particular, we begin
with a formal definition of a digital signature system. Then we define security for a signature
scheme. Next, we describe DSA. Finally, we demonstrate how the security of DSA would be
compromised if an efficient discrete logarithm method is discovered.
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Definition 7 Digital Signature System
A digital signature system is a triple of PPT algorithms (G,S, V ) such that,
1. G is a key generation algorithm that on input 1k computes output (e, d).
2. S is a signature generation algorithm that on input (1k, d,m) computes output s.
3. V is a verification algorithm that on input (e, s,m) computes output v.
where 1k is the security parameter, e is the public verification key, d is the secret signing
key, m ∈ {0, 1}k is the message to be signed, s ∈ {0, 1}k is the signature string and
v ∈ {true, false} is the boolean value indicating the validity of the signature, such that if
G→ (e, d) then V (e, S(d,m),m) = true.
A strong definition of security for a digital signature system is a system that is secure
against existential forgery under chosen message attack [7]. In a chosen message attack, the
adversary can choose messages to be signed by the signer. A signature can be existentially
forged if, in polynomial time, an adversary can create a message and signature that verifies with
greater than negligible probability even though the message may not be the adversary’s choice.
Algorithm 8 DSA Key Generation
Input: Security parameter: 1k
Output: Public verification key: e, Secret signing key: d
L,N ⇐ bit-lengths of p and q, respectively, to provide security equivalent to k
p⇐ L-bit prime modulus
q ⇐ N -bit prime such that q|(p− 1)
g ⇐ generator of subgroup of Z∗p of order q such that 1 < g < p
x⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and q
y ⇐ gx mod p
d⇐ (p, q, g, x)
e⇐ (p, q, g, y)
return (e, d)
In DSA, a private key is (p, q, g, x) and a public key is (p, q, g, y), where p, q are prime
with q|(p− 1), g ∈ Z∗p is an element of order q, x is a secret exponent, and y = gx mod p. This
looks similar to keys in ElGamal with the addition of the prime, q. The element g is chosen
so that it generates the cyclic subgroup of Z∗p of order q. Note that while the group, Z∗p , is not
fixed for all of DSA, it is also not different for every user. Instead, the values (p, q, g) are called
domain parameters and are generated and fixed for a particular domain of users.
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Algorithm 9 DSA Signature Generation
Input: Message: m, Secret signing key: d = (p, q, g, x), Approved hash function: Hash()
Output: Signature of m: s = (s′, r′)
k ⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and q
k−1 ⇐ inverse of k mod q using extended Euclidean algorithm
r′ ⇐ (gk mod p) mod q
s′ ⇐ (k−1(Hash(m) + xr′)) mod q
s⇐ (s′, r′)
return s
Algorithm 10 DSA Signature Verification
Input: Message: m, Signature: s = (s′, r′), Public verification key: e = (p, q, g, y), Approved
hash function: Hash()
Output: Validity: v, such that v = true ⇐⇒ s is a valid signature of m
w ⇐ (s′)−1 mod q // using extended Euclidean algorithm
z ⇐ Hash(m)
u1 ⇐ zw mod q
u2 ⇐ r′w mod q
v′ ⇐ (gu1yu2 mod p) mod q






DSA security depends on the difficulty of solving discrete logarithms. An efficient
algorithm for finding discrete logarithms would result in a complete break of DSA. Recovering
the secret signing key, x, from the public key, y ≡ gx mod p, can be achieved by solving the
discrete logarithm in Z∗p or in the subgroup of Z∗p of order q.
C. Fixed Groups in Cryptographic Protocols
Previous algorithms selected a new group for every exchange or key pair, but in practice
the group is often chosen from a small list of predefined groups. For example, consider a Diffie-
Hellman key exchange. The two participants must first agree upon a group and a generator. In
theory, one of the participants could always start by randomly selecting a group at the time of
the exchange. However, in reality, using common security protocols, the participants will likely
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agree to use a group that is specified in their protocol standard.
In this section, we look at the use of fixed groups in cryptography. In particular, we first
provide examples of two commonly used cryptographic protocols that define specific groups.
These are Secure Shell [29] and Internet Protocol Security [10]. Then, we examine the motiva-
tions for specifying fixed groups in protocol standards. Following this, we discuss the security
risks of reusing groups.
1. Groups in SSH
Protocol standards often specify just a few fixed groups for Diffie-Hellman key ex-
changes. The standard for Secure Shell (SSH) [29] only defines two groups. The two pre-
defined groups are subgroups of Z∗p where p is a specific 1024-bit prime and a 2048-bit prime,
respectively. The primes were selected by a method described in the OAKLEY key determi-
nation protocol [20]. In addition to the two required groups, an SSH implementation is free to
add additional groups. But since both client and server implementations must have a specific
group predefined, this is essentially a mechanism to add additional standard groups. The SSH
standard does not require support for on-the-fly group generation.
There is, however, a proposed Internet standard, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the
Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol [5], that extends SSH to allow new private groups.
The standard defines a method for an SSH server to propose a new group to the client. For this
Diffie-Hellman group exchange extension to be effective, it must be supported by implementa-
tions and new private groups must actually be created. The popular OpenSSH implements the
group exchange, but does not automatically generate new groups. Instead, a utility is included
that allows a server administrator to generate new groups from the command line. Without new
group generation being automatic and transparent to the user, it is likely that standard groups
will still be used even between implementations supporting this extension.
2. Groups in IKE
The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [10] is the key exchange protocol used in Internet
Protocol Security (IPsec). IKE uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and specifies just four
fixed groups. The first two are subgroups of Z∗p where p is a 768-bit prime and 1024-bit prime
respectively. The two primes are chosen by the same Oakley method as in SSH. The other
two standard groups in IKE are a 155-bit and a 185-bit elliptic curve group. The disparity in
14
bit-lengths is because more efficient algorithms are known for solving discrete logarithms in
Z∗p groups than in well chosen elliptic curve groups. Therefore a smaller elliptic curve group is
believed to provide security equivalent to a larger Z∗p group.
3. Advantages of Fixed Groups
There are many valid reasons to specify fixed groups for Diffie-Hellman key exchanges
in a protocol standard. In this subsection, we discuss two major advantages of specifying fixed
groups. The first advantage we consider is the reduction in protocol complexity. The second
advantage we examine is that the standard groups can be carefully selected to be secure, saving
the user the computational expense of creating new secure groups.
Reduced Protocol Complexity
If a protocol is shorter and less complex, its security is easier to analyze and there are
fewer opportunities for flaws. A simpler protocol also makes implementation easier with less
chance of errors or incompatibilities with other implementations. Using fixed groups reduces
the protocol complexity. In particular, it eliminates the need to communicate a description of
the group before the key exchange. Additionally, it eliminates the need for clients to implement
a method of secure group selection, which as we see in the next section, can be a complicated
process.
Securely Selected Groups
If a group is predefined, it can be carefully selected for desired security properties, and
the selection is not bound by the computational limitations that would exist if the group selection
was done during a live protocol transaction. A protocol standard must ensure that the key
exchange provides an appropriate level of security, and the security provided by a group depends
on more than just bit-length. Certain groups are weak and must be avoided. Specifically, if the
group order is the product of only small prime factors, discrete logarithms can be computed
efficiently in this group [21]. (See Section F on page 24.)
In both SSH and IKE, the groups were selected with the Oakley method to achieve goals
of efficiency, security, and trust that there is no back-door. In particular, for an n-bit prime, p,
the Oakley method fixes the first and last 64-bits to all ones to speedup modular exponentiation.
Then the interior bits of p are set to (c+m), where c is the first (n− 128) bits of pi and m is the
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smallest positive integer such that p and (p − 1)/2 are both prime. The reason for using pi as
the source of randomness is to avoid “any suspicion that the primes have secretly been selected
to be weak” [20].
Additionally, using standard groups eliminates the need for the computationally inten-
sive process of group creation within the protocol. Creating a new group requires finding a
prime, p, and a generator, g of Z∗p . No efficient method is known for finding a generator of Z∗p
for a random prime, p. This is because efficiently determining that a number is a generator re-
quires knowing the factorization of p−1, the order of the group, and factorization is believed to
be a hard problem. Therefore, instead of first choosing a random p, we must generateN = p−1
with a known factorization and then test that p is a prime.
To avoid creating a weak group, we want N to have a large prime factor. (Again, see
Section F on page 24.) Because N is even, our best case is if N = 2q for q prime. Thus,
to create a secure group Z∗p , we must select random primes, qi, until p = 2qi + 1 is prime.
Many iterations of primality testing make this a computationally intensive process. If this had
to be done at the start of each transaction, the user may find the long delay unacceptable. If the
group creation was performed automatically on the server it could potentially enable a denial of
service attack.
4. Risks of Using Fixed Groups
The downside of using a fixed group is that it places a high premium on attacking a
single group. There will be many key exchanges over the same group over many years. To an
adversary, the value of solving all discrete logarithms over this fixed group will be much higher
than the value of solving all discrete logarithms over a random group that may be used only
once. For example, while the value of decrypting a single bank transaction may be small, the
value of attacking many simultaneously would be great.
The computational cost of computing multiple logarithms in a single group is much less
than computing the same number of logarithms in separate groups. This is because algorithms
to find discrete logarithms often require a precomputation dependent only on the group. Once
the precomputation is complete for a group, finding additional discrete logarithms in that group
is comparatively easy.
Using fixed groups also allows the time-consuming precomputation to occur before a
specific key-exchange occurs. Consider a hypothetical attack where the precomputation takes
one year, but then solving each instance takes just one hour. (The attacker can trade off instance-
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time for precomputation-time, so such a disparity is not unreasonable.) Given a random group,
the adversary would always take one year from key exchange to solving the key. However, once
an adversary has completed the precomputation for a standard group, a key in that group could
be solved just one hour after the exchange occurs. If the encrypted information is only valuable
to the attacker for a short period of time, only the second attack is worthwhile.
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III. Survey of Discrete Logarithm Algorithms
In this chapter, we survey the known algorithms for solving discrete logarithms and
perform a traditional analysis of their complexity. In particular, we begin by distinguishing
between generic algorithms, which work in all cyclic groups, and group-specific algorithms,
which apply only in certain families of groups. Then we define the model of computation on
which we will base our analysis. After that, we survey several generic algorithms. Lastly, we
consider the index calculus algorithm, which is group-specific. For each algorithm we find the
asymptotic running time and space requirements.
A. Generic vs. Group-Specific Algorithms
There are several known algorithms for solving discrete logarithms. In this section, we
divide the algorithms into two categories, generic algorithms and group-specific algorithms.
The first category we call generic algorithms, because they apply generally over any type of
cyclic group. A generic algorithm solves the generalized discrete logarithm problem (GDLP).
The second category of algorithms are the group-specific algorithms. These are specialized
algorithms that make use of the structure in the group elements and apply only within certain
families of groups.
The generic algorithms we will consider include Shank’s algorithm [16], which is also
called the Baby-Step Giant-Step algorithm, Pollard’s Rho and Pollard’s Kangaroo algorithms [22].
These algorithms apply over any cyclic group including elliptic curve groups and subgroups of
Z∗p , where better methods do not apply. The group-specific algorithms we discuss are index
calculus algorithms. They apply in Z∗p . Therefore, index calculus algorithms solve the standard
discrete logarithm problem (DLP).
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B. Model of Computation
In this section, we define our model of computation. In particular, we begin by defining
the abstract machine that which will execute the algorithms. Then we define the notation used
in our analysis. Finally, we explain the format we will use for our analysis of each algorithm.
For our analysis of algorithms to be consistent we need to define a model of computation.
Central to that is defining a standard abstract machine for finding the asymptotic running time
of each algorithm. Our model uses a multitape Turing machine, which is a good model of
a standard computer. We provide our runtime complexity in terms of the number of group
operations. We do this because the complexity of the group operation varies among different
group families.
Now we define the standard notation we use in our analysis. For each algorithm, we
have a cyclic group G and a generator g of that group. We let N be the order of g,
N = |〈g〉|,
and let n be the bit-length of N ,
2n−1 ≤ N < 2n,
n = dlog2Ne.
When describing the asymptotic performance of these algorithms, we do so in terms of n, as
is common practice. In terms of storage, we assume that elements of G can be represented in
O(n) bits. This assumption is reasonable because there are less than 2n elements in G.
In the following sections, we perform a traditional complexity analysis of several known
algorithms for solving discrete logarithms. Each analysis will follow a standard format. For
each algorithm we begin with a description of the algorithm itself. Next, we analyze the algo-
rithm’s runtime complexity. Then we analyze the asymptotic space requirements of the algo-




We begin our survey of generic algorithms, with the simplest method, brute-force or
exhaustive search. That is simply trying every possible exponent (g0, g1, g2, ...) until a match is
found.
Algorithm 11 Brute-Force Search
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator: g, Group Element: a
Output: Exponent: x such that gx = a
1: b⇐ 1
2: x⇐ 0
3: while a 6= b do
4: b⇐ b× g
5: x⇐ x+ 1
6: end while
7: return x
In the worst case, where a = gN−1, every exponent would be tested, requiring a total
of N tests. In terms of the bit-length of the input, n, this requires 2n group operations and
comparisons in the worst case. In the average case, one can expect to find the correct exponent
after searching half the space, or 2n−1 group operations. In either case, the running time of the
algorithm is exponential, O(2n), and will quickly become intractable for increasing n.
On the other hand, the space requirements are minimal. At each step we need only to
store x and b, and both can be represented in n bits. Therefore, the asymptotic space requirement
of the brute-force algorithm is O(n).
D. Precomputed Table Algorithm
Just two average-case runs of the brute-force search algorithm requires an amount of
work equivalent to computing all N exponents. Consider, instead, if one first computed all N
exponents and stored them. That is the idea behind our next algorithm, the precomputed table
algorithm. We build a table holding every discrete logarithm for the group. After computing
the table, finding an individual discrete logarithm requires just a single table lookup.
The running time of the algorithm is dominated by the precomputation, which requires
N group operations. The asymptotic running time of the precomputed table algorithm isO(2n).
The advantage of the algorithm is the instant solutions of subsequent discrete logarithms in the
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Algorithm 12 Precomputed Table Algorithm
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator: g, Group Element: a
Output: Exponent: x such that gx = a
1: // First build the table such that hash[gx] = x for 0 ≤ x < N
2: b⇐ 1
3: for x = 0 to N − 1 do
4: hash[b]⇐ x
5: b⇐ b× g
6: end for
7: // Now perform the table lookup
8: x⇐ hash[a]
9: return x
same group; only a single table lookup is required.
Of course, this algorithm is infeasible for values of n of cryptologic significance, as it
is exponential in both time and space complexity. The lookup table holds N values of size n,
giving an asymptotic size of O(n2n).
E. Shank’s Algorithm
Solving discrete logarithms using brute-force search requires O(2n) group operations.
With a precomputed table, we can do it in constant time but require O(n2n) bits of storage.
What if we could find an optimal point between these two extremes? Shank’s Algorithm gives
us a way to achieve such a balance.
Shank’s Algorithm is also known as the baby-step giant-step algorithm. The algorithm
has two stages. In the first stage of the algorithm, we step consecutively through the first X
powers of gi : g0, g1, g2, ...gX−1. These are the “baby-steps”. At each step we store the expo-
nent, i, in a hash table indexed by gi. After X steps we have a table of discrete logarithms, but
only for the first X elements of the cyclic group.
In the second stage, we want to transform the input a = gx into a value that is in our
range of precomputed discrete logarithms. Starting from gx, we step X elements at a time
through the cyclic group until we reach the beginning of the cycle where we have precomputed
the logarithms. To take these “giant-steps”, we simply multiply by gX ,
gxgX = gx+X ,
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Algorithm 13 Shank’s Algorithm
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator: g, Group Element: a, Number of exponents to precom-
pute: X
Output: Exponent: x such that gx = a
1: // Build table hash such that hash[gi] = i for 0 ≤ i < X
2: b⇐ 1
3: for i = 0 to X − 1 do
4: hash[b]⇐ i
5: b⇐ b× g
6: end for
7: // Now compute successive exponents until you find one in the hash
8: b⇐ a
9: y ⇐ 0
10: h⇐ hash[b]
11: while gh 6= b do
12: b⇐ b× gX
13: y ⇐ y + 1
14: h⇐ hash[b]
15: end while




When we find a value in the precomputed range we will have the equation,
gh = gx+yX
Now we can solve for x,
h = x+ yX mod N
x = h− yX mod N
We are certain to hit a logarithm in the precomputed a range of X consecutive exponents,
because we are stepping by exactly X exponents at a time.
Now we will consider the runtime of the algorithm. The first stage requires X group
operations. The runtime of the second stage will vary depending on the number of giant steps to
reach the precomputed range of exponents. The most steps will be needed when X < x < 2X ,
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putting x just outside the range of precomputed exponents. In this worst case, the second
stage will take dN
X
e group operations (multiplications by gX). (We can store the precomputed
exponents in a hash table to avoid the cost of sorting the table.)
To minimize the total computation time, we must choose X so that the number of baby-

















Given X = 2
n
2 , both stages of the algorithm take 2
n
2 group operations. Therefore the runtime
complexity of Shank’s algorithm is O(2
n
2 ). Although the running time is still exponential, it is
a significant improvement over the brute-force search.
The space requirements are a middle ground between the brute-force search and the
precomputed table algorithms. The table in Shank’s algorithm will require X entries of size




The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm makes use of the prime factorization of N , the order of
the group. For groups of prime order this algorithm provides no advantage and is equivalent to
Shank’s algorithm. Our analysis will focus on the case where the order,N , has only small prime
factors. This is where the algorithm is most efficient, and this is why some groups are weaker
than others, motivating standards bodies to include specific “secure” groups in their standards.
The first step of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm is to factor, N , the order of the group.






For each unique prime factor, pi, we solve for xi ≡ x mod pnii . Once each xi is found
they can be combined using the Chinese Remainder Theorem to find x, requiring O(k logN)
group operations and O(k logN) space [21].
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Algorithm 14 Pohlig-Hellman Algorithm
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator: g, Group Element: a, Order of group: N
Output: Exponent: x such that gx = a





2: // For each factor pnii find xi ≡ x mod pnii
3: for i = 1 to k do
4: z ⇐ a
5: h⇐ g−1
6: q ⇐ (p− 1)/pi
7: gi ⇐ gq
8: for j = 0 to (ni − 1) do
9: w ⇐ zq
10: bj ⇐ loggi w // Solve this discrete logarithm using Algorithm 13
11: z ⇐ zhbj
12: h⇐ hpi








17: Solve for x given x1, ...xk using the Chinese Remainder Theorem
18: return x





From Algorithm 14, bj = loggi w, where log is a discrete logarithm. The base gi = g
(p−1)/pi ,
so the order of the gi is pi. For a group with a large prime factor, pi, the dominant step will be
finding the discrete logarithm in the subgroup of order pi using Shanks algorithm.
For small pi, discrete logarithms can be solved with precomputed tables. In the case
where all pi are small relative to N , the dominant step of the algorithm is computing w =
zn, requiring O(logN) group operations [21]. The number of times zn must be computed is∑k
1 ni, which is O(logN) when the prime factors are small. This gives a total running time of
O(logN)2 or O(n2).
G. Pollard’s Rho Algorithm
The next algorithm we present, Pollard’s Rho algorithm, has a running time on the same
order as Shank’s, but does so while avoiding a large stored table. The rho algorithm takes
advantage of the birthday paradox; that is there is greater than 50% probability that 2 people
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out of 23 chosen randomly will share a birthday. More generally, when selecting elements at
random from N elements, a collision will be found after an expected
√
piN/2 selections [27].
To find the discrete logarithm of an element a to the base g, Pollard’s Rho algorithm
steps through a random sequence of group elements si that can be represented as products of
powers of a and g.
si = a
aiggi = gxaiggi = gxai+gi .
The algorithm searches for a cycle in the sequence, two elements su, sv, u 6= v such that su = sv.
Solving this equation for x gives the discrete logarithm of a.
su = sv
gxau+gu = gxav+gv
xau + gu ≡ xav + gv mod N
xau − xav ≡ gv − gu mod N
x(au − av) ≡ gv − gu mod N
x ≡ (au − av)−1gv − gu mod N
The running time is dominated by a search for a cycle in the sequence. Finding a cycle
could be accomplished by storing each element in the sequence until one is repeated. This would
require a large amount of storage, so instead Pollard uses the Floyd cycle-finding algorithm
which requires storing just two sequence elements si and s2i. The element, s2i, is always twice
as far into the sequence as si and a cycle is found when si = s2i. To advance both sequences, one
step of the algorithm requires a total of three steps of the sequences. Pollard’s [22] calculations
gave a mean value for i of 1.08
√
N . The asymptotic running time is O(2
n
2 ) group operations
and storage of just O(n).
Algorithm 15 is an improved version of Pollard’s Rho method due to van Oorschot and
Wiener [27]. Their method finds the cycle by stepping just once through the sequences, pro-
viding a speedup by a factor of 3. This is possible because they store distinguished points.
Distinguished points are elements of the group with an easily distinguished property, for exam-
ple, elements where the first c bits of their binary representation are zeros. We start at a random
location and step through the sequence until we reach a distinguished point. We store the dis-
tinguished point and start again from a new random location. When we reach a distinguished
point that we already have stored, we have found a cycle and can solve for the logarithm.
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Algorithm 15 Pollard’s Rho Algorithm
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator: g, Group Element: a, Order of g: N
Output: Exponent: x such that gx = a
1: // Search for a cycle in the random sequence S = s0, s1, ... defined by Algorithm 16
2: success⇐ false
3: D ⇐ a subset of distinguished points from G
4: while (success = false) do
5: i⇐ 0
6: ai ⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
7: gi ⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
8: si ⇐ ggiaai
9: repeat
10: i⇐ i+ 1
11: Calculate si, ai, gi applying Algorithm 16
12: until (si ∈ D)
13: // If we have already stored this point before
14: if ((aj, gj)⇐ hash(si)) then
15: success⇐ true
16: else
17: hash(si)⇐ (ai, gi)
18: end if
19: end while
20: m⇐ ai − aj mod N
21: x⇐ m−1(gj − gi) mod N
22: return x
The running time of this version of the rho algorithm is the sum of the time to find a
collision, Tc, plus the time to reach a distinguished point, Td. If we assume the sequence is
a random mapping, then the expected time to a collision will be Tc =
√
piN/2. The time to
reach a distinguished point depends on the frequency of distinguished points. Given that there
are c
√













steps. The total expected running time of the rho algorithm is





















The asymptotic running time in terms of the bit-length n is O(2
n
2 ).
The algorithm needs storage for the distinguished points. The expected number of dis-
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Algorithm 16 Pollard’s Rho - Random Sequence Algorithm
Input: Element: si, Exponents: ai, gi, such that si = aaiggi
Output: Element: si+1, Exponents: ai+1, gi+1, such that si+1 = aai+1ggi+1
1: // Given a partitioning of G into three equal-sized subsets S1, S2, S3
2: if si ∈ S1 then
3: si+1 = asi
4: ai+1 = ai + 1 mod N
5: gi+1 = gi
6: else if si ∈ S2 then
7: si+1 = si
2
8: ai+1 = 2ai mod N
9: gi+1 = 2gi mod N
10: else if si ∈ S3 then
11: si+1 = gsi
12: ai+1 = ai
13: gi+1 = gi + 1 mod N
14: end if
15: return si+1, ai+1, gi+1
tinguished points will be the expected number of steps multiplied by the fraction of elements

















For each distinguished point, we store a pair of n-bit exponents. Thus the total expected stor-
age required by the algorithm is (c
√
2pi + 2)n bits. Because c is a constant, the total storage
requirement is O(n).
H. Pollard’s Kangaroo Algorithm
Another generic algorithm discovered by Pollard [22] is the kangaroo or lambda method.
It has a runtime that differs from the Pollard’s Rho method by only a constant. It can also be
used to find discrete logarithms when the exponent is known to lie in a smaller interval. We
present an improved version, due to van Oorschot and Weiner [27], that uses distinguished
points.
The kangaroo-method gets its name because it can be described with an analogy of two
kangaroos hopping. If we imagine each element of the the cyclic group as being steps on a
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Algorithm 17 Pollard’s Kangaroo Algorithm
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator: g, Group Element: a, Order of g: N
Output: Exponent: x such that gx = a
1: // Select a small sequence of possible step sizes
2: S ⇐ (s0, s1, . . . , sk−1) where si = 2i and k such that the mean of the entries is
√
N
3: R⇐ (r0, r1, . . . , rk−1) where ri = gsi
4: // Select a hash function to map a group element to a particular step size, si
5: h(x)⇐ hash function mapping G into the interval [1..k]
6: D ⇐ a subset of distinguished points from G
7: // The “tame” kangaroo starts off half way through the cycle
8: xt ⇐ gN2
9: dt ⇐ 0
10: // The “wild” kangaroo starts off from a = gx
11: xw ⇐ a
12: dw ⇐ 0
13: success⇐ false
14: while (success = false) do
15: // Step the tame kangaroo one hop
16: i⇐ h(xt)
17: xt ⇐ xtri
18: dt ⇐ dt + si
19: if xt ∈ D then
20: // If we have already stored this point for a wild kangaroo
21: if ((m,xi, di)⇐ hash(xt)) && (m = ’wild’) then
22: x⇐ N
2
+ dt − di
23: success⇐ true
24: else
25: hash(xt)⇐ (’tame’, xt, dt)
26: end if
27: end if
28: // Step the wild kangaroo one hop
29: i⇐ h(ww)
30: xw ⇐ xwri
31: dw ⇐ dw + si
32: if xw ∈ D then
33: // If we have already stored this point for a tame kangaroo
34: if ((m,xi, di)⇐ hash(xw)) && (m = ’tame’) then
35: x⇐ N
2
+ di − dw
36: success⇐ true
37: else






path, ordered by exponent, (g0, g1, g2, . . .), then each hop of the kangaroo is from one element
of the group to another. The distance of the hop, si, is selected from a small set of possible hop
distances S. The choice of si is based only on the current position, x, using a hash function
h(x) = i. This means that any kangaroo that lands on a particular element will always take the
same sequence of hops from then on.
The algorithm uses two kangaroos (sequences), one wild and one tame. The wild one
starts on element a = gx. Its starting position exponent, x is unknown; it is the discrete log-
arithm that we are trying to find. We start the tame kangaroo at a known position, halfway
through the cycle, at g
N
2 . We alternate stepping the wild and tame kangaroos. We keep track of
their respective positions, xw, xt, and their respective distances traveled, dw, dt.
We want the wild kangaroo to land on the path of the tame kangaroo. Since we know the
exponent of the tame kangaroo, N
2
+ dt, we can calculate the discrete logarithm by subtracting
the distance traveled by the wild kangaroo,
logg a = x ≡
N
2
+ dt − dw mod N
As the two kangaroos jump, their paths will eventually converge.
Anytime a kangaroo lands on a distinguished point, we store which kangaroo, the point,
and the distance traveled in a hash table. If the other kangaroo has already stored this point in
the hash table, then the paths have converged, and we can solve for the discrete logarithm. The
use of distinguished points allows us to discover the convergence point quickly while reducing
memory accesses and storage requirements. Memory only needs to be read or written on the
small percentage of steps that land on distinguished points.
To find the runtime and storage requirements, we follow the approximate analysis of
Pollard [23]. We consider the algorithm as three stages:
1. The kangaroo in back must catch up with the starting point of the other kangaroo.
2. The back kangaroo must then land on the path of the other kangaroo.
3. The back kangaroo must continue until it reaches a distinguished point.
Throughout each stage, the back kangaroo could be either the wild or the tame kangaroo.
At the start, the back kangaroo can be at most half a cycle behind and on average will be
a quarter of a cycle behind or N
4















steps, on average, to catch up to the starting point of the front kangaroo. Given




Once the back kangaroo has caught up, it must land on the front kangaroo’s path. Given
a mean step size, m, one out of every m elements will be on the kangaroo’s path, on average.
Each hop of the back kangaroo has a 1
m
chance of landing on the other kangaroo’s path. Thus
the kangaroo will land on the path after an expectedm hops or 2m total steps of both kangaroos.







Now that the back kangaroo is on the same path, it must step until it reaches a distin-
guished point. Given that there are c
√
N distinguished points in the group for some constant








elements is a distinguished point. The kangaroo will land on























Given that c is large, the running time is approximately 2
√
N . The asymptotic running times in
terms of the bit-length n is O(2
n
2 ).
The algorithm needs storage for the distinguished points. The expected number of dis-
tinguished points will be the expected number of steps multiplied by the fraction of elements









) = 2c(1 +
1
c
) = 2(c+ 1)
For each distinguished point, we store a pair of n-bit quantities: a group element and an integer
distance. Thus the total expected storage required by the algorithm is 4(c+ 1)n bits. Because c
is a constant, the total storage requirement is O(n).
I. Index Calculus Algorithm
The index calculus algorithm takes advantage of the structure of the group elements,
specifically the fact that group elements can be factored into a product of primes. Unlike the
generic algorithms that treat the group as a black box and work in any group, the index calculus
algorithm only applies to groups with the necessary structure, like Z∗p . The algorithm is divided
into three phases. In the first phase, a number of linear relations are found. In the second phase,
a solution is found to the system of linear relations. In the final phase, an individual discrete
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logarithm instance is solved.
The index calculus algorithm (Algorithm 18) depends on the fact that many elements
of the group can be represented as the product of a small number of group elements. In the
case of Z∗p , many integers can be represented as a product of small primes. An integer is called
B-smooth if it has no prime factors larger than B. The primes less than B make up a factor
base, S = (p1, p2, . . . , pk) where there are k primes less than B. A B-smooth integer is one that
can be represented as a product of the elements of S.
With an optimal choice for the bound, B, the running time of the index calculus algo-
rithm is subexponential. That is, it is faster than any algorithm that is exponential in the input
size. We will use the standard notation for subexponential running times [16],
Lp(α, c) = O(exp ((c+ o(1))(ln p)
α(ln ln p)1−α)),
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and c > 0. If the first parameter, α, is 0, the algorithm is polynomial with
degree equal to the second parameter, c. If α is 1, the algorithm is fully exponential. For α
between 0 and 1, the algorithm is called subexponential.
When comparing two algorithms using the Lp(α, c) notation, the smaller the value α,
the shorter the asymptotic running time. If both algorithms have the same α, then the one with
the smaller value of c will be faster.
During the first phase of the algorithm, we generate random group elements, gy, by
randomly selecting exponents, y. We test each element to find any that are B-smooth and factor
those we find. Then we take the logarithm of the factorization, giving us a linear equation in
terms of the discrete logarithms of the primes in the factor base. We continue until we have
more relations than there are unknowns.
In the second phase, we solve for the k unknowns among the linear relations found in
Phase 1. Phase 2 is complete when we have a table that holds the discrete logarithms of each of
the primes in the factor base, table(i) = logg pi for 0 ≤ i ≤ k.
The third phase proceeds much like the first, except now we need to find just one B-
smooth integer. It will be of the form gx+y where x = logg a is the discrete logarithm we are
trying to solve and y is between 0 and p−1. We randomly select y, until u = agy = gxgy = gx+y






Algorithm 18 Index Calculus Algorithm
Input: Prime: p, Generator of Z∗p: g, Element of Z∗p: a
Output: Exponent: x satisfying gx ≡ a mod p, where 0 ≤ x < p− 1.
1: // Setup: Select a factor base
2: B ⇐ a bound for the largest prime in the factor base, S
3: S ⇐ (p1, p2, . . . , pk) where S contains all primes, pi < B
4: // Phase 1: Find linear relations of the factor base
5: // Find a few more relations than the size of the factor base to ensure a unique solution
6: for j = 0 to k + c do
7: repeat
8: y ⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
9: u⇐ gy mod p
10: until (u is B-smooth)









ci logg pi (mod p− 1)
15: end for
16: // Phase 2: Solve system of linear relations
17: Given the k + c relations from Phase 1, solve for the k unknown discrete logarithms of the
factor base.
18: Store the logarithms, such that table(i) = logg pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
19: // Phase 3: Solve for the individual discrete logarithm
20: repeat
21: y ⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
22: u⇐ agy mod p
23: until (u is B-smooth)





26: // Take logarithms of both sides
27: x+ y =
∑
1≤i≤k




ci table(i)− y (mod p− 1)
29: return x
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ci logg pi (mod p− 1).
The discrete logarithms for any of the small primes, pi, can be read from the table created in




(citable(i))− y (mod p− 1).
To analyze the running time, we consider the time of each phase separately. The run-
ning time of the first phase, T1, will be the number of smooth elements that need to be found,
k, multiplied by Es, the expected number of elements to test to find one B-smooth element,
multiplied by the time, Ts, to test one element for smoothness. That is
T1 = kEsTs.
Solving the linear system requires having as many linear equations as there are un-
knowns. The unknowns are the logarithms of the factor base. Thus, we need to find as many
B-smooth elements as there are primes in our factor base. The size of the factor base is the
number of primes less than B,
k = pi(B) ≈ B
logB
.
The expected number of integers to test to find one B-smooth integer depends on the
distribution of smooth integers. The probability that a random element of Z∗p is B-smooth is
p/ψ(p,B) where ψ(p,B) is the number of B-smooth numbers less than p. Thus, we expect to
find a B-smooth element after testing Es = p/ψ(p,B) random elements. An approximation for
the number of B-smooth numbers less than p is
ψ(p,B) = pu−u,
where u = log p/ logB. Therefore,
Es = p/ψ(p,B) =
p
pu−u
= uu = (log p/ logB)log p/ logB.
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The time required to test an element for smoothness depends on the method used. The
simplest method, trial division, will require k divisions where k is the size of the factor base, S.
A sieving method where many values are tested simultaneously is much more efficient, giving
a time Ts = log logB [24]. The total runtime of the Phase 1 is
T1 = kEsTs =
B
logB
(log p/ logB)log p/ logB log logB.
The running time of Phase 2 is the time to solve a k × k linear system. Using Gaussian
elimination would takeO(k3) time, but because the system is very sparse there are methods that
work in O(k2) time [14]. Recall that k ≈ B
logB






The calculation for the running time of Phase 3, T3, is very similar to that of Phase 1. The
biggest difference is that in Phase 3 only one smooth element needs to be found. That means
the sieving approach used in Phase 1 to find many smooth elements simultaneously is not appli-
cable. Instead, the most efficient method is elliptic curve factorization in time LB(12 ,
√
2) [16].
This gives a total running time for Phase 3 of







With an optimal choice for the bound, B, Adleman [1] showed that the index calcu-
lus algorithm is subexponential with a running time of Lp(12 , c). Coppersmith, Odlyzko, and
Schroeppel [2] showed that by using sieving methods in Phase 1 a running time of Lp(12 , 1)
could be achieved. Currently the fastest algorithm for solving discrete logarithms in Z∗p is a
complex variant of the index calculus algorithm called the number field sieve. The running
time of the number field sieve for discrete logarithms is Lp(13 , 1.923), but a discussion of this
algorithm is beyond the scope of this thesis. The storage requirement of the index calculus
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algorithm is the space needed to represent the system of linear equations. Although the system
being solved is k × k, the system is very sparse and the zero entries need not be stored. Each
equation will have fewer than logB non-zero entries of size n. So the asymptotic size of the










The asymptotic space and running times of the algorithms presented in this chapter are
summarized in Table 3. The running times of all the generic algorithms are exponential, with the
three best being O(2
n
2 ). Pollard’s Rho and Pollard’s Kangaroo algorithms achieve this running
time with only linear storage requirements. The kangaroo method is about 1.60 times slower





The running time of the only group-specific algorithm presented, the index calculus algorithm,
is subexponential in both running time and in space.
Algorithm Space Running Time
Brute-Force Search O(n) O(2n)






Pollard’s Rho O(n) O(2
n
2 )
Pollard’s Kangaroo O(n) O(2
n
2 )







Table 3: Complexity of Discrete Logarithm Algorithms
Not included in the table is the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm. The dominant step of that
algorithm is to compute the discrete logarithm in the subgroup of order q, where q is the largest
prime factor of N . The runtime of the algorithm will therefore be that of the algorithm to solve
the discrete logarithm in a prime subgroup. Any generic algorithm could be used for this step.
Pohlig and Hellman initially suggested Shank’s algorithm [21], but the rho algorithm would be
the superior choice today.
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IV. Complexity of Discrete Logarithms over Fixed Groups
In this chapter, we examine the complexity of discrete logarithms over fixed groups. In
particular, we introduce the para-discrete logarithm problem, a variant of the discrete logarithm
problem that more closely models cryptologic applications over fixed groups. Next, we discuss
how to model an adversary with access to a group-specific precomputation. Then we re-examine
each algorithm from the previous chapter as a para-discrete logarithm solver. We summarize
the analysis with a chart showing the run times and precomputation sizes for each algorithm.
We then apply our analysis of generic algorithms to place an upper bound on the complexity of
the generalized para-discrete logarithm problem. Finally, we use our analysis of index calculus
algorithms to place an upper bound on the para-discrete logarithm problem.
A. The Para-Discrete Logarithm Problem
Complexity theoretic models are useful for evaluating the security of real world crypto-
graphic applications. However, a model can also provide a false sense of security if it oversim-
plifies the implementation details or makes bad assumptions about the capabilities of the adver-
sary. To illustrate this point, imagine a protocol that implements ElGamal public key encryption.
This hypothetical protocol requires a user to prove they know their private key by responding
with the plaintext after receiving an encrypted random number as a challenge. This allows an
adversary to mount a chosen ciphertext attack. Consider an adversary who intercepts a cipher-
text, (c1 = gb, c2 = gabm), encrypted with user A’s public key, ga, and wants to read the secret
message, m. The adversary selects a random, r, and sends (c′1 = c1 = g
b, c′2 = c2r = g
abmr) to
the userA as a random number challenge. UserAwill decrypt and return the seemingly random
message, m′ = mr. From m′, the attacker easily solves for m by multiplying by r−1, giving
m = mrr−1. Thus, if ElGamal is used within a flawed protocol, the difficulty of the discrete
logarithm problem is irrelevant. A security model must consider the protocol as a whole and
not just the underlying cryptography.
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The use of fixed groups in security protocols inspires the question: Do our existing
models sufficiently capture these applications? In the DLP and GDLP, the group and generator
are inputs to the problem along with a particular instance to solve. Yet in a fixed group imple-
mentation, every instance takes place over the same small set of groups. Does this provide an
advantage to an adversary? We propose a new complexity problem that more closely models
these fixed group protocols, the para-discrete logarithm problem.
Definition 19 The Para-Discrete Logarithm Problem (PDLP)
Setup: Let p = p2, p3, p4, . . . be an infinite sequence of primes, where pi is a prime of bit-
length, i. Let g = g2, g3, g4, . . . be an infinite sequence of integers, where 0 < gi < pi
and gi generates Z∗pi .
Input: Security Parameter: 1n, Group Element: a ∈ Z∗pn , where pn ∈ p.
Output: Exponent: x satisfying gnx ≡ a mod pn, where gn ∈ g
Unlike in the standard discrete logarithm problem, the group and generator are not inputs
to the para-discrete logarithm problem. Instead, there is just a security parameter, 1n, that
specifies the bit-length of the prime modulus. The prime modulus, pn, comes from an infinite
sequence of primes, with exactly one prime for a given bit-length. We contend this problem
is a better computational model for discrete logarithms over fixed groups, because for a given
security parameter there is a single defined group.
Just as the discrete logarithm problem can be generalized from Z∗p to any cyclic group
G, we can generalize the para-discrete logarithm problem.
Definition 20 The Generalized Para-Discrete Logarithm Problem (GPDLP)
Setup: Let G = G1, G2, G3, . . . be an infinite sequence of groups, where Gi is a cyclic group
of order Ni, such that 2i−1 < Ni ≤ 2i. Let g = g1, g2, g3, . . . be an infinite sequence of
group elements, where gi ∈ Gi and gi generates Gi.
Input: Security Parameter: 1n, Group Element: a ∈ Gn, where Gn ∈ G.
Output: Exponent: x satisfying gnx = a, where gn ∈ g
Just as in the PDLP, the group is not an input to the GPDLP problem. Instead, the group
is determined by the security parameter 1n. For a given n, the group is fixed to Gn where Gn is
an element of an infinite sequence of groups G1, G2, ....
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B. The Para-Discrete Logarithm Problem with an Advice String
By removing the group as an input to the problem, the PDLP more closely models fixed
group applications. In applications where groups are generated on the fly and used once, the
adversary gains no advantage through a precomputation; the precomputation can only be used
once. In contrast, with fixed groups a precomputation can provide the adversary an advantage
for all instances over the life of the cryptographic application.
We model this precomputation as an advice string. In computational complexity theory
an advice string is an extra input to a computational problem that depends only on the length of
the input. By the definition of the PDLP, the group is fixed for a given input length. This allows
us to consider a group-specific computation as producing an advice string for the PDLP. (In the
standard DLP setting, the precomputation could not be considered an advice string because it is
dependent on an input to the problem, the specific group.)
We assert that a conservative approach to evaluating the security of a protocol is to con-
sider an attack where the adversary has access to a precomputation based only on the protocol
standard. In the case of a protocol with fixed groups, we should consider an adversary with
access to a group-specific precomputation. Using the advice-string formalism allows us to bet-
ter consider the difficulty of solving discrete logarithms once a group-specific precomputation
has been completed. We can consider the time and space complexity of solving the instance
separately from the time to create the precomputation.
C. Para-Discrete Logarithm Algorithms
In this section, we re-examine each algorithm from the previous chapter as a para-
discrete logarithm solver. We want to analyze the complexity of the PDLP with an advice
string. To assist this, we explicitly divide each algorithm into two sub-algorithms: the advice-
generator (precomputation phase) and the instance-solver (search phase). The advice-generator
performs a precomputation based only on the group and generator, not the specific problem
instance. That allows us to treat the precomputation’s output as an advice string for the PDLP.
The instance-solver searches for the solution of a specific problem instance making use of the
advice string. For each algorithm, we determine the asymptotic runtime of both phases and the
size of the advice string.
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1. Brute-Force Search and Precomputed Table Algorithms
We begin our re-examination, with the two simplest algorithms. In the brute-force
search, there is no precomputation done. If we try to modify the brute-force search to have
a precomputation, we end up with the precomputed table algorithm. The precomputed table
algorithm very naturally divides into the two algorithms we are looking for. In the advice-
generator algorithm, the table of all logarithms is built. In the instance-solver algorithm a single
lookup into the table returns the discrete logarithm.
Algorithm 21 Precomputed Table: Advice Generator
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator: g
Output: Advice string: hash such that hash[gx] = x for 0 ≤ x < N
1: b⇐ 1
2: for x = 0 to N − 1 do
3: hash[b]⇐ x
4: b⇐ b× g
5: end for
6: return hash
Algorithm 22 Precomputed Table: Instance Solver
Input: Group Element: a, Advice string: hash
Output: Exponent: x such that gx = a
1: x⇐ hash[a]
2: return x
The advice-generator will require N group multiplications to preform the precomputa-
tion. The asymptotic running time of the advice-generator is O(2n). The size of the advice
string (the precomputed hash table containing N exponents) is exponential in n, O(n2n). After
the precomputation, the instance solver requires a single table lookup to solve an individual
discrete log.
2. Shank’s Algorithm
The hash table built in Shank’s algorithm is independent of a particular discrete loga-
rithm instance, so the hash table can act as the advice string. That is, the advice-generator builds
the hash table. The instance-solver then giant-steps from the input a until it reaches an element
with a precomputed discrete logarithm in the hash table.
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Algorithm 23 Shank’s Algorithm: Advice Generator
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator: g, Number of exponents to precompute: X
Output: Advice string: hash such that hash[gi] = i for 0 ≤ i < X
1: b⇐ 1
2: for i = 0 to X − 1 do
3: hash[b]⇐ i
4: b⇐ b× g
5: end for
6: return hash
Algorithm 24 Shank’s Algorithm: Instance Solver
Input: Group Element: a, Advice string: hash, Number of precomputed logarithms: X
Output: Exponent: x such that gx = a
1: b⇐ a
2: y ⇐ 0
3: h⇐ hash[b]
4: while gh 6= b do
5: b⇐ b× gX
6: y ⇐ y + 1
7: h⇐ hash[b]
8: end while
9: x⇐ h− yX mod N
10: return x
Now we consider the runtime of each algorithm. For general X , the advice-generator
takes X group operations to generate an advice string with X entries of size n-bits, resulting in
an advice string of O(nX). The instance-solver takes, on average, N
2X
operations. For X = 2
n
2 ,
both the advice generator and instance-solver take 2
n
2 group operations. Therefore, the runtime
complexity of both algorithms is O(2
n
2 ) with an advice string of O(n2
n
2 ).
The best choice ofX varies depending on the particular trade-offs of a given application.
A smaller choice for X means a quicker precomputation and a smaller advice string, but at
the expense of a longer runtime for the instance solver. Likewise, a larger X means quicker
instance solving, but at the expense of a larger advice-string and a longer runtime for the advice
generator. Note that for X = 1 we have essentially the brute-force search, and for X = N we
have the precomputed table algorithm.
Given a desired number, k, of instances to solve in a particular group, we can select anX
to minimize overall computation time. The total computation time is that of one precomputation
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plus k instance computations,




To minimize f(X), we find the positive zero of the derivative,
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dX























2 . This gives a total computation time of
√
2kN









3. Pollard’s Rho Algorithm
As we examine Pollard’s Rho algorithm, we see that it does not fit the two-phase pattern.
The algorithm only requires a small amount of storage while running and does not make use
of a precomputation. The random sequence depends on a particular instance, a = gx, we are
trying to solve. It it not immediately clear how a instance-independent precomputation could
assist this algorithm. Using our terminology there is only an instance-solver algorithm and it
uses no advice string.
However, [13] analyzes how work can be saved from each instance of the rho algorithm,
speeding the solution of subsequent instances over the same group. They note that the table
of distinguished points stored during computation of one logarithm becomes a table of known
logarithms once that instance has a solution. Those distinguished points can be saved and
used to assist the next instance and so on. The saved distinguished points are effectively a
precomputation for solving the next instance.
This idea can be extended to create a useful advice string, a database of logarithms of
distinguished points. The advice generator selects random exponents, i, to create random ele-
ments, gi, and stores the discrete logarithm each time a distinguished point is found. Additional
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distinguished points are found until the desired advice size has been reached. Let d be the num-
ber of distinguished point logarithms we precompute. In one extreme, where d = 0, we have the
standard rho algorithm. At the other extreme, where d equals the total number of distinguished
points in the group, we completely remove the benefit of finding cycles in the random sequence;
the first time we reach a distinguished point, we can solve the logarithm. This extreme is clearly
inferior to Shank’s algorithm where precomputing each logarithm requires only a single group
operation.
Algorithm 25 Pollard’s Rho Algorithm: Advice Generator
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator: g, Order of g: N , Number of logarithms of distinguished
points to precompute: d
Output: Advice string: hash such that hash[aaiggi ] = (ai, gi) for some aaiggi ∈ D
1: D ⇐ a subset of distinguished points from G
2: // Randomly chose exponents and store logarithms of d distinguished points
3: for j = 1 to d do
4: repeat
5: i⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
6: si ⇐ gi
7: until (si ∈ D)
8: hash(si)⇐ (0, i)
9: end for
10: return hash
Kuhn and Struik [13] show that computing a total of X logarithms in the same group
takes time
√
2NX and that the X + 1 logarithm can be computed in time
√
N/2X for X <<
N1/4.
We design our advice generator so that it creates the number of distinguished points, d,
equivalent to having solved X logarithms. Because the results of Kuhn and Struik are limited





















The size of advice depends on θ, the proportion of elements that are distinguished points. For
the time estimate of the instance solver to be accurate, it must reach many distinguished points.
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Algorithm 26 Pollard’s Rho Algorithm: Instance Solver
Input: Group Element: a, Order of g: N , Advice string: hash
Output: Exponent: x such that gx = a
1: // Search for a cycle in the random sequence S = s0, s1, ... defined by Algorithm 16
2: success⇐ false
3: D ⇐ a subset of distinguished points from G
4: while (success = false) do
5: i⇐ 0
6: ai ⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
7: gi ⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
8: si ⇐ ggiaai
9: repeat
10: i⇐ i+ 1
11: Calculate si, ai, gi applying Algorithm 16
12: until (si ∈ D)
13: // If we have already stored this point before
14: if ((aj, gj)⇐ hash(si)) then
15: success⇐ true
16: else
17: hash(si)⇐ (ai, gi)
18: end if
19: end while
20: m⇐ ai − aj mod N
21: x⇐ m−1(gj − gi) mod N
22: return x
Thus we select θ = c/N2/5. The number of distinguished points stored equals the runtime of






In terms of the bit-length n, the asymptotic runtime is O(2
3n
5 ) for the advice-generator
and O(2
2n
5 ) for the instance-solver, given an advice-string of size O(n2
n
5 ).
4. Pollard’s Kangaroo Algorithm
Pollard’s Kangaroo method does not fit the two-phase model, but we can adapt it to this
setting. Recall that in this method, there are two kangaroos. The wild kangaroo starts at the
instance we are trying to solve. The tame kangaroo starts from a fixed point on the cycle. Since
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the tame kangaroo’s behavior is independent of a particular instance, we can step through the
tame kangaroo in the advice-generator phase. Then in the instance-solver algorithm, we only
need to step the wild kangaroo.
Algorithm 27 Pollard’s Kangaroo Algorithm: Advice Generator
Input: Cyclic Group: G, Generator: g, Order of g: N , Mean step size: m
Output: Advice string: hash such that hash[gi] = i for some gi ∈ D
1: // Select a small sequence of possible step sizes
2: S ⇐ (s0, s1, . . . , sk−1) where si = 2i and k such that the mean of the entries is m
3: R⇐ (r0, r1, . . . , rk−1) where ri = gsi
4: // Select a hash function to map a group element to a particular step size, si
5: h(x)⇐ hash function mapping G into the interval [1..k]
6: D ⇐ a subset of distinguished points from G
7: // The “tame” kangaroo starts off at the beginning of the cycle
8: xt ⇐ g0
9: dt ⇐ 0
10: while (dt < N ) do
11: // Step the tame kangaroo one hop
12: i⇐ h(xt)
13: xt ⇐ xtri
14: dt ⇐ dt + si
15: if xt ∈ D then





In the advice-generator, the tame kangaroo steps through the entire cycle, building a
hash table of all the distinguished points along its path. For our analysis we will use m for the
mean step size of the values in set S and c for the mean distance between distinguished points.
The time of the first phase will be N
m
and the storage will be N
mc
.
In the instance-solver, the wild kangaroo steps through the cycle until it reaches a dis-
tinguished point stored in the advice string. To analyze the runtime we can break down the
instance solver in to two stages:
1. The wild kangaroo must first land on the path of the tame kangaroo.
2. The wild kangaroo must then continue until it reaches a distinguished point.
In Stage 1, the wild kangaroo must land on the tame kangaroo’s path. Given a mean step size,
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Algorithm 28 Pollard’s Kangaroo Algorithm: Instance Solver
Input: Group Element: a, Order of g: N , Advice string: hash
Output: Exponent: x such that gx = a
1: // Use the same set S as in the advice-generator
2: S ⇐ (s0, s1, . . . , sk−1) where si = 2i and k such that the mean of the entries is m
3: R⇐ (r0, r1, . . . , rk−1) where ri = gsi
4: // Use the same hash function as in the advice-generator
5: h(x)⇐ hash function mapping G into the interval [1..k]
6: D ⇐ a subset of distinguished points from G
7: // The “wild” kangaroo starts off from a = gx
8: xw ⇐ a
9: dw ⇐ 0
10: success⇐ false
11: while (success = false) do
12: // Step the wild kangaroo one hop
13: i⇐ h(ww)
14: xw ⇐ xwri
15: dw ⇐ dw + si
16: if xw ∈ D then
17: // If we have already stored this point for a tame kangaroo
18: if (di ⇐ hash(xw)) then






m, each hop of the wild kangaroo has a 1
m
chance of landing on the tame kangaroo’s path. Thus
the kangaroo will land on the path after an expected m hops.
In Stage 2, the wild kangaroo is on the path of the tame kangaroo and must reach a dis-
tinguished point. Given that one of every c elements is a distinguished point, the wild kangaroo
will land on a distinguished point after an expected c hops.
Combining the times from both stages gives a total runtime of m + c for the instance-
solver. If we select c = m, the runtime becomes 2m and the size of the advice string is N
m2
.
We can perform a trade-off between the runtime and the size of the advice string by varying m.
















This gives us a advice size and instance-solver time of 2m = 3
√

















In terms of n, the bit-length of N , the instance-solver runs in O(2
n
3 ) time with an O(2
n
3 ) size
advice string. The advice-generator runs in O(2
2n
3 ) time.
5. Index Calculus Algorithm
The index calculus algorithm needs essentially no changes to match our desired two al-
gorithm pattern. Phases 1 & 2 already use only the group description to create a precomputation
result. Combined, the first two phases become the advice-generator. The table of logarithms
of the factor base becomes the advice string, and final phase becomes our instance-solver algo-
rithm.
The runtime of the advice generator will be the runtime of Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the
standard index calculus algorithm,
tadvice = T1 + T2 =
B
logB




The runtime of the instance generator is that of Phase 3,












Looking at the structure of the algorithm, there is clearly a large imbalance between
the runtime of the advice-generator and that of the instance-solver. The instance solver has to
find only a single B-smooth integer, while the advice-generator must find k + c ≈ k B-smooth
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Algorithm 29 Index Calculus Algorithm: Advice Generator
Input: Prime: p, Generator of Z∗p: g
Output: Advice string: table such that table(i) = logg pi for 0 ≤ i < k.
1: // Setup: Select a factor base, S
2: B ⇐ a bound for the largest prime in the factor base
3: S ⇐ (p1, p2, . . . , pk) where S contains all primes, pi < B
4: // Find linear relations of the factor base
5: // Find a few more relations than the size of the factor base to ensure a unique solution
6: for j = 0 to k + c do
7: repeat
8: y ⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
9: u⇐ gy mod p
10: until (u is B-smooth)









ci logg pi (mod p− 1)
15: end for
16:
17: // Solve system of linear relations
18: Given the k + c linear relations, solve for the k unknown discrete logarithms of the factor
base.
19: Store the logarithms, such that table(i) = logg pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
20: return table
integers. In addition, half the time of the advice-generator is spent solving the system of linear
relations.
With B optimized to minimize the precomputation, B = Lp(12 ,
1
2
), the running time of
the instance solver is tinstance = Lp(12 ,
1
2





Lp(α, c) = O(exp ((c+ o(1))(ln p)
α(ln ln p)1−α)),
Thus, asymptotically, the instance time runs in just the square root of the advice time.
The choice of the bound, B, allows tradeoffs between the size of the advice and the
runtime of the instance solver. A larger B will result in a larger advice string, but make the
search for B-smooth elements faster for the instance-solver.
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Algorithm 30 Index Calculus Algorithm: Instance Solver
Input: Element of Z∗p: a, Advice string: table
Output: Exponent: x satisfying gx ≡ a mod p, where 0 ≤ x < p− 1.
1: // Solve for the individual discrete logarithm
2: repeat
3: y ⇐ randomly selected exponent between 0 and p− 1
4: u⇐ agy mod p
5: until (u is B-smooth)





8: // Take logarithms of both sides
9: x+ y =
∑
1≤i≤k




ci table(i)− y (mod p− 1)
11: return x
D. Summary
In this section, we summarize the runtimes of the advice-generator and instance-solver
algorithms for the para-discrete logarithm problem. For the algorithms that allow a time-
memory trade-off, the formulas governing the trade-offs are shown in Table 4.
Algorithm Advice-Generator Time Advice Size Instance-Solver Time



























Table 4: Time-Memory Trade-Offs of Para-Discrete Logarithm Algorithms
The entries of Table 5 represent a specific trade-off point where advice size and instance
time are roughly balanced. Each of the generic algorithms solve the GPDLP. The result from
the precomputed-table algorithm shows that the GPDLP can be solved in constant time given an
advice string exponential in size. More interestingly, using Pollard’s Kangaroo algorithm, the
GPDLP can be solved in O( 3
√




The index calculus algorithm places an upper bound on the complexity of the PDLP in Z∗p . The
PDLP can be solved in subexponential time, Lp(12 ,
1
2





Algorithm Advice-Generator Time Advice Size Instance-Solver Time

































Table 5: Complexity of Para-Discrete Logarithm Algorithms
In our conservative model of security for protocols over fixed groups, we consider only
the instance-solver time, assuming a group specific precomputation is available. Under this
model, the cryptographic strength provided by fixed groups is significantly less than that of
one-time groups. This disparity is demonstrated when we compare the instance-solver runtimes
with the standard runtimes from the previous chapter.
By comparing the results of Table 5 with those of Table 3, we see that the discrete
logarithm in a particular group is significantly easier given a group-specific advice string. In the
case of the generic algorithms, the GDLP can be solved in O(2
n
2 ), but given an advice string of
O(n2
n
3 ) can be solved in O(2
n
3 ) time using the kangaroo instance-solver algorithm. Similarly,
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